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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on 
individual behavior in contests. In all treatments we find significant over-expenditure of effort 
relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display 
decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the 
aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the 
dynamics of individual behavior. We develop a behavioral model which incorporates a non-
monetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization. The model explains significant 
over-expenditure of effort. It also suggests that decrease in ‘social distance’ between group 
members through photo display promotes pro-social behavior and decreases over-expenditure of 
effort, while improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals participating in contests and tournaments encounter disparate information 
feedback settings. Fellow contestants may be known or unknown, and their effort level may be 
observable or unobservable. In some contests, such as competition for a new job or admission to 
a university, fellow contestants are typically unknown and their effort level is unobservable. In 
other contests, such as promotions in the workplace and political races, fellow contestants are 
often known and their effort level is observable. In patent races, opponents are usually known 
but their effort is unobservable. Such design details can have strong bearing on individual and 
group behavior, yet existing theory provides little guidance on their effect on decision-making. 
Since the early attempts of Bull et al. (1987) and Millner and Pratt (1989), experimental 
literature on contests has been rapidly expanding, encompassing facets such as player 
asymmetry, entry costs, risk preferences, and contest structure; for a comprehensive review see 
Dechenaux et al. (2012). However, most existent laboratory studies focus on the actions of 
agents where identity of opponents is unknown and where there is ex post complete information 
feedback about opponents’ efforts. We argue that knowing the opponents’ identities and effort 
levels are important design features that can influence individual behavior in practice (Smither et 
al., 2005). For instance, workplace managers may choose to explicitly identify the workers being 
considered for a promotion and make known their effort level, or they may choose to keep the 
identity of the workers being considered unknown (Harbring et al., 2007; Gürtler and Harbring, 
2010). 
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of social identification 
and information feedback on individual and group behavior in a lottery contest, where 
individuals exert effort in order to win a prize. We consider a contest structure where higher 
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effort leads to more socially wasteful outcomes (i.e., rent-seeking and lobbying). Using this 
structure, we compare an information setting where all group members are completely 
anonymous to one where the identity of each group member is fully revealed to others using the 
member’s photo and first name. We also compare information conditions in which members do 
not learn about other group members’ effort to one where they receive full information feedback 
about each group member’s effort. 
In all treatments, we find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the standard 
theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort by 
17%. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, 
but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the dynamics of individual 
behavior. We develop a behavioral model that incorporates a non-monetary utility of winning 
and relative payoff maximization. The model explains significant over-expenditure of effort. It 
also suggests that decrease in ‘social distance’ between group members through photo display 
promotes pro-social behavior and decreases over-expenditure of effort, while improved 
information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model that 
we will use as a benchmark for our results. Section 3 details the experimental design and 
procedures. Section 4 reports the results of the experiment. Section 5 develops a behavioral 
model to explain the main findings of the experiment. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the 
application of our findings and our contribution to the existing literature, as well as suggest 
directions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Model 
The standard rent-seeking (lottery) contest assumes that   identical risk-neutral 
individuals compete for a prize   by exerting efforts. The probability that an individual   wins 
the prize is equal to individual  ’s own effort    divided by the sum of all individuals’ efforts: 
           
  
∑   
 
   
.         (1) 
The individual’s probability of winning increases monotonically in own effort and decreases in 
the opponents’ efforts. The expected payoff for risk-neutral individual   is given by 
                        .       (2) 
That is, the probability of winning the prize            times the prize value   minus the cost of 
effort   . Differentiating (2) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium leads to a classical solution (Tullock, 1980): 
  
     
  
 .          (3) 
The equilibrium expected payoff can be calculated by plugging (3) into (2), which gives 
     
 
  
 .          (4) 
These predictions serve as a benchmark for our experiment. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory 
at Purdue University. A total of 240 undergraduate student subjects participated in 12 sessions (3 
sessions per treatment), with 20 subjects participating in each session. All subjects participated in 
only one session of this study. Some subjects had participated in other economics experiments 
that were unrelated to this research. 
5 
 
The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record 
subject decisions and display photos of subjects. Upon arriving at the lab, each subject was 
photographed and then randomly assigned to a computer station. The experiment comprised of 
playing a lottery contest game for a total of 20 periods with a group of 4 participants. Each 
subject was randomly assigned to a group of 4 at the beginning of the experiment, and remained 
matched with the same group members for the duration of the experiment. At the beginning of 
each period, each subject received an endowment of 80 experimental francs and was asked to 
make an effort (choose a bid) in a lottery contest with a prize valued at 80 experimental francs. 
Each subject’s probability of winning the prize was equal to his/her effort divided by the 
aggregate effort of all 4 participants in the group. 
We conducted four treatments, as in Table 1, using a two-by-two design in which we 
varied the information feedback (“no information” NI versus “information” I) and the 
identification of group members (“no photo” NP versus “photo” P). The only difference between 
the information treatments was the feedback provided to subjects at the end of each period. In the 
treatments with no information feedback (NP-NI and P-NI), we provided feedback only about 
the individual’s own effort, earnings, and whether she won or not, but did not provide 
information about the efforts of other group members or the identity of the winner of the contest. 
In the treatments with information feedback (NP-I and P-I), we assigned each member an ID 
number (1-4), provided full information about each group member’s effort and explicitly 
revealed (using the ID number) which subject’s effort resulted in winning the contest at the end 
of each period. We varied the degree of social identification by varying whether or not the 
identities of participants were revealed to fellow group members. In treatments where no 
identities were revealed (NP-I and NP-NI), we did not provide any identifying information about 
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other members in the group. On the other hand, in treatments P-NI and P-I, we provided photos 
and first names of each group member.
1
 
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of 20 periods were selected for payment using a 
random draw from a bingo cage. Experimental francs were used throughout the experiment, with 
a conversion rate of 15 francs = $1. The experimental earnings, including the $5 participation 
fee, averaged $18.75, and ranged from a low of $8.25 to a high of $30.00.
2
 Sessions (including 
instruction time) lasted approximately 60-80 minutes. At the end of each session, subjects also 
completed a single-period game aimed at eliciting their non-monetary utility of winning, and a 
demographic questionnaire. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Overview 
Table 2 summarizes the average efforts and payoffs for all four treatments. In 
equilibrium, all subjects should exert an effort of 15 and receive a payoff of 5.
3
 However, on 
average the observed effort in all treatments is significantly greater than predicted (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, all p-values<0.05, n=15), and as a result, the average payoffs are negative.
4
 The 
persistence of over-expenditure is also shown in Figure 1, which displays the average effort over 
all 20 periods of the experiment. Although there is a declining trend, the average effort remains 
significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction. Such significant over-expenditure of 
                                                 
1
 Before the beginning of the experiment, subjects in the P-NI and P-I treatments were asked to write their first 
names on a name card, and the experimenter took a photo of each subject holding up the name card. Similar to the 
design of Andreoni and Petrie (2004), we chose to use digital photos to identify subjects to one another because 
digital photos capture and preserve the appearance of the person but do not allow for communication, which may 
confound the effects of identification alone.  
2
  Photographing participants in the photo identification treatments took more time, so an additional $5 “surprise 
show up fee” was added at the end of the experiment in order to comply with the laboratory policies. 
3
 According to equation (3), individual effort is e=80(4-1)/16=15, and according to equation (4), expected payoff is 
E(e)=80/16=5. 
4
 The non-parametric tests employ each group of four subjects as an independent observation. 
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effort is consistent with previous findings of contest experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2012; 
Sheremeta, 2013).
5
 
Result 1: In all treatments there is significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the 
Nash equilibrium prediction. 
We also find significant heterogeneity in individual behavior, which is inconsistent with 
play at a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 15. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the 
average bid by subject in each treatment. Subjects are sorted in increasing order by the average 
bid, which is indicated by the solid line. The error bars represent the standard deviations of bids 
for each subject over all 20 periods. Hence, by focusing on the solid line one can decipher the 
cumulative empirical distribution of the average bid across subjects (signifying the between-
subjects heterogeneity), and by focusing on the error bars one can get a sense of the degree of 
within-subject heterogeneity. Figure 2 clearly shows that there is a very high degree of both 
between-subjects and within-subject heterogeneity, which is also consistent with previous 
findings of contest experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2012; Sheremeta, 2013). 
 
4.2. Social Identification 
Examining the impact of social identification, we find that in the treatments in which 
subjects’ photos are revealed (P-NI and P-I), the average effort is 17% lower than when there is 
no photo identification (NP-NI and NP-I). Combining data from both photo treatments and 
comparing it to data from no-photo treatments, we find that photo display (or social 
                                                 
5
 Some studies that document significant overbidding in contests are done by Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. 
(1998), Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b, 2011), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Price and Sheremeta (2011), Cason et al. 
(2012), Chowdhury et al. (2012), Mago et al. (2013), and Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013). 
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identification) significantly reduces the average effort (28.7 versus 24.6: Mann-Whitney test, p-
value=0.06; n=m=30).
6
 
Result 2: Identifying group members through photo display decreases average effort. 
We also consider how the role of identification differs in early rounds as compared to 
later rounds (see Figure 1). We find that efforts averaged across the first 5 periods are 
significantly lower in treatments with identification than without identification (27.3 versus 31.4, 
Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.05; n=m=30). However, in later periods 16-20, efforts are not 
significantly different between treatments with identification and without identification (23.4 
versus 25.3, Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.66; n=m=30). Therefore, while aggregate efforts 
decline in all four treatments, the rate of decline in the photo identification treatments is lower 
compared to treatments without identification. The impact of identification on individual 
behavior in contests is immediate and becomes evident in the early periods of the experiment. 
 
4.3. Information Feedback 
Examining the impact of information feedback, we find no significant difference in the 
average effort levels between treatments where there is information feedback and where there is 
no information feedback. Combining the data from both information treatments and comparing it 
to the data from the no-information treatments, we find no significant impact of information on 
effort (26.7 versus 27.1: Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.63; n=m=30).
7
 
                                                 
6
 The average effort of 25.1 in P-NI is lower than the average effort of 29.1 in NP-NI, and the average effort of 24.1 
in P-I is lower than the average effort of 28.3 in NP-I. However, these pair-wise treatment comparisons are not 
significant at the conventional level (Mann-Whitney test, p-values=0.14 and 0.24; n=m=15). 
7
 The average effort of 29.1 in NP-NI is not significantly different from the average effort of 28.3 in NP-I and that 
the average effort of 25.1 in P-NI is not significantly different from the average effort of 24.1 (Mann-Whitney test, 
p-values=0.98 and 0.55; n=m=15). 
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Although information feedback has no impact on the average effort level, it appears to 
impact the heterogeneity of effort (see Figure 2). Table 3 provides two different measures of 
heterogeneity of effort. The between-subjects heterogeneity measure in period t is calculated as 
the absolute difference between individual effort and average group effort in period t. The 
within-subject heterogeneity measure in period t is calculated as the absolute difference between 
individual effort in period t and period t-1. The average between-subjects heterogeneity measure 
in the information treatments (NP-I and P-I) is significantly lower than in the no information 
treatments (NP-NI and P-NI), when comparing all periods (16.0 versus 13.4; Mann-Whitney test, 
p-value=0.03; n=m=30), as well as the first five periods (15.3 versus 12.8; Mann-Whitney test, 
p-value=0.05; n=m=30). However, there is no significant difference in the average within-subject 
heterogeneity measure (all p-values>0.5). Therefore, it appears that information feedback does 
not impact the within-subject heterogeneity, but it does make effort levels more uniform across 
subjects. 
Next, we examine the mechanism through which information influences individual 
behavior. Table 4 displays a panel regression that measures the impact of different lag variables 
in period t-1 on effort in period t. When subjects receive no feedback information about others’ 
efforts (specification 1), we find that the major predictor of individual effort is the effort-lag 
variable, i.e., their own effort in period t-1.
8
 The effort-lag variable remains a significant 
predictor of effort even when subjects receive full feedback about others’ efforts (specification 
2). In addition, above-lag and below-lag variables are significant in specification (2). The 
negative and significant above-lag variable indicates that subjects whose effort is higher than the 
                                                 
8
 Note that in treatments NP-NI and P-NI, subjects actually do not learn whether their effort in t-1 was above or 
below the winning effort. However, the above-lag and below-lag variables in specification (1) are included to 
facilitate the comparison with specification (2). The estimation results of specification (1) are virtually the same 
when we exclude these two variables from the estimation of specification (1). 
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winning effort in period t-1 reduce their effort in period t; and the positive and significant below-
lag variable indicates that subjects whose effort is lower than the winning effort in period t-1 
increase their effort in period t. 
Result 3: Providing information about others’ efforts does not have a significant effect 
on the average effort level, but it decreases the within-subject heterogeneity of effort and 
significantly affects the dynamics of individual effort. 
The dynamics of individual effort can explain several patterns in our data. First, it can 
explain why we find no significant impact of information on average effort – there are two 
opposing effects acting simultaneously (i.e., above-lag and below-lag) that on average 
counterbalance each other. Second, the negative above-lag and positive below-lag variables 
imply that over time efforts within the group should become more uniform, explaining why 
information significantly reduces between-subjects heterogeneity. Finally, the significant lag 
variables imply substantial within-subject heterogeneity of efforts, which persist over all periods 
of the experiment. In sum, the results of our experiment clearly indicate that providing 
information feedback in contests changes the dynamics of individual effort, although it does not 
change the aggregate effort. 
 
5. Behavioral Model 
To explain the main findings of our experiment, we develop a behavioral model. To 
explain over-expenditure of effort relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction (Result 1), we 
assume that in addition to the value of the prize  , individuals also have a non-monetary “utility 
of winning”  . Therefore, instead of (2), the updated expected payoff            of individual   
is given by 
11 
 
                              .      (5) 
The non-monetary utility of winning   is not directly observable, but it can be elicited 
(Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012). In a ‘surprise’ additional period at 
the end of the experiment, all subjects were given an endowment of 80 francs, and participated in 
a lottery contest for a prize valued at     francs. Subjects were explicitly told that their effort 
is costly and that the cost of effort would be subtracted from their earnings. We find that 51% of 
subjects indicate a non-monetary utility of winning by exerting positive efforts for the prize 
valued at 0 francs, with about 25% of subjects choosing efforts higher than 10 francs (equivalent 
to $0.67). 
To analyze the extent to which non-monetary utility of winning affects subjects’ efforts, 
we provide panel regression analysis in Table 5, where the dependent variable is the subject’s 
effort and the independent variables are a period trend, treatment dummy-variables, and their 
non-monetary effort. The standard errors are clustered at the group level. Specification (1) 
indicates a significant and positive correlation between effort and the non-monetary variable.
9
 
This finding suggests that winning is a component in a subject’s utility, and that non-monetary 
utility of winning may partially explain over-expenditure of effort in contests. Moreover, our 
data indicate that the non-monetary utility of winning is not impacted by either information about 
others’ efforts or by identification of group members.10 This suggests that the differences in 
                                                 
9
 One may argue that the non-monetary utility of winning coefficient is capturing confusion instead of a non-
monetary utility of winning. We control for confusion by using the quiz variable that measures the number of correct 
answers on the quiz, which was administered right after the instructions. Consistent with the intuition, we find that 
subjects who understand the instructions exert lower efforts, but this result is only marginally significant for the P-I 
treatment. Despite controlling for confusion, the non-monetary coefficient is positive and significant. 
10
 The non-monetary utility of winning is not significantly different across treatments. Efforts for the prize of zero 
are slightly higher in the no-photo treatments NP-NI and NP-I than in the photo treatments P-NI and P-I (the average 
of 9.2 versus 7.0), but the difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.27; n=m=120). Moreover, all 
pair-wise treatment comparisons show no significant difference across treatments (Mann-Whitney test, all p-
values>0.15; n=m=60). 
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behavior observed in treatments with and without social identification are not due to changes in 
the non-monetary utility of winning w. 
To explain how social identification (Result 2) and information feedback (Result 3) 
impact individual behavior, we assume that individuals care about payoffs of others in their 
group. Specifically, following the convention established in evolutionary game theory 
(Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004; Riechmann, 2007), we assume that individuals care 
about “relative payoff maximization” instead of “absolute payoff maximization”.11 Therefore, 
instead of (5), individual   cares about the weighted average payoff of all group members, i.e., 
            
 
 
∑   (      ) , where   is the interdependent social payoff parameter.
12
     
reflects preferences of pro-social individuals who strive to increase the payoff of the entire 
group, while     reflects preferences of status-seeking individuals who strive to obtain a 
higher relative payoff within the group. 
Accounting for the behavioral factors captured by   and  , the expected payoff for a risk-
neutral player   is given by 
            
           
 
 
∑   (      ) .     (6) 
Differentiating (6) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium gives us 
the equilibrium effort: 
  
     
      
     .         (7) 
                                                 
11
 Vriend (2000) and Reichmann (2006) also show that learning by imitation of successful others is also equivalent 
to maximizing relative payoffs. 
12
 Evolutionary game theory often assumes that players care about the absolute difference in payoffs, i.e., their 
“survival” payoff. Here, we assume that players care about absolute and weighted payoffs. This is a more common 
assumption in the social preference literature (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
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The equilibrium effort (7) increases in the non-monetary utility of winning  , i.e., 
  
  
  , and 
decrease in the social payoff parameter  , i.e., 
  
  
  . 
The interdependent social payoff parameter   represents a measure of how individuals 
weight their payoffs relative to others. In other words, this measure reflects the degree of ‘social 
distance’ between group members.13 Although   is not directly observable, it can be calculated 
once a non-monetary utility of winning   is known. To do this, we first derive from equation (7) 
the effort    that symmetric contestants, having a non-monetary utility of winning  , should 
exert in a contest with the prize of zero (i.e.,    ): 
   
     
      
 .          (8) 
Next from equations (7) and (8) we can derive the value of  : 
  
     
       
   .         (9) 
Using the observed average effort   for the prize of 80 francs and the effort    for the 
prize of 0 francs, we estimate the value of   for each subject. Upon calculating individual-
specific   for each subject, we find that 67% of subjects behave as status-seekers (i.e.,    ) and 
only 33% of subjects are pro-social (i.e.,    ). Therefore, the majority of subjects behave as if 
they are relative payoff maximizers (or status-seekers), i.e., they maximize the difference 
between their own payoff and weighted payoffs of other group members; and their relative 
payoff maximization exercise provides an equilibrium explanation for the observed over-
expenditure (Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004).
14
 Next, we discuss how social 
                                                 
13
 Hoffman et al. (1996, pg. 654) define social distance to be the “degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist 
within a social interaction.” 
14
 This quest to seek higher expected payoff than others is also consistent with the ‘spite effect’ contended by 
Hamilton (1970) or ‘survival of the fittest’ contended by Alchian (1950). 
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identification and information feedback may impact s, and consequently the individual behavior 
in contests. 
Social Identification: A decrease in ‘social distance’ increases the value of the social 
payoff parameter s, and according to our behavioral model should decrease efforts in the 
contest.
15
 Revealing individual identities is one way to reduce social distance between the 
individual and other members in the group and induce pro-social behavior (Andreoni and Petrie, 
2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2011).
16
 Indeed, we find that the median 
value of the social payoff parameter   is higher in the photo treatments than in the no-photo 
treatments (-1.15 versus -1.48), suggesting that social identification through photo display 
decreases social distance between group members. Consistent with the prediction that decrease 
in social distance reduces over-expenditure of efforts, we find that the average effort of 24.6 in 
the photo treatments (P-NI and P-I) is lower than the average effort of 28.7 in the no-photo 
treatments (NP-NI and NP-I). 
Information Feedback: Information about others’ efforts can give rise to regret. The basic 
concept of regret, analyzed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007, 2008) in the first price 
auction, is that the winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second 
highest bid (winner regret) and the loser may regret missing a profitable trade opportunity by 
bidding too low (loser regret). Similar rationale holds true in contests, and regret theory predicts 
that bids (efforts) should decrease in winner regret (analogous to higher s) and increase in loser 
regret (analogous to lower s). Since regret effects effort in the opposite direction and the 
                                                 
15
 Hoffman et al. (1996, pg. 654) define social distance to be the “degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist 
within a social interaction.” 
16
 Eckel and Petrie (2011) attribute this in part to the association of attractiveness and skin tone with expectations 
about a partner's behavior. Another potential explanation of why photo display enhances pro-social behavior is 
based on group social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Ahmed, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009). In addition to 
revealing identities, in related work Scharleman et al. (2001) find that “smiles” can elicit cooperation among 
strangers in a one-shot bargaining interaction. 
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equilibrium effort level depends on the relative weight of each type of regret, the precise effect 
of full information disclosure on social payoff parameter   cannot be predicted a priori 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2009). In our data, we find that the median value of the social 
payoff parameter   is similar across the two information treatments (-1.34 versus -1.25). 
However, as documented earlier (see Table 4), we find that both the above-lag (can be 
interpreted as the winner regret) and below-lag (can be interpreted as the loser regret) variables 
are significant. This helps explain why information feedback makes no difference to the average 
effort level, but reduces the between-subjects heterogeneity of effort.
17
 In this regard, our results 
are consistent with the experimental test of regret theory by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 
(2008).
18
 
In summary, our behavioral model that incorporates a non-monetary utility of winning 
and relative payoff maximization can explain our data. The former can explain the significant 
over-expenditure of effort (Result 1) and the latter can explain why social identification through 
photo display decreases the average effort (Result 2) and improved information feedback reduces 
the between-subjects heterogeneity of effort (Result 3). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
What happens to competitive behavior in contests when identities of other participants 
and information about their effort are revealed? Does such information increase or decrease 
individual effort? To answer these questions, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which we 
                                                 
17
 Full information feedback can also facilitate faster learning of the incentives inherent in the contest structure. 
When information about all individual efforts is public knowledge, subjects may learn about profitable strategies 
more quickly from the experience of others, and this also reduces the between-subjects heterogeneity of effort, as 
evident in our data. 
18
 By manipulating information feedback, they find evidence of both winner regret and loser regret. However, they 
find that no difference in bid levels when there is complete information on both winner and loser regret compared to 
when there is no information about other participants’ bid levels. 
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investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in 
contests. In all treatments, we find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to standard 
theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. 
Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect aggregate effort but it 
decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the dynamics of individual 
behavior. We develop a behavioral model that incorporates non-monetary utility of winning and 
relative payoff maximization. The model explains significant over-expenditure of effort. The 
model also suggests that decrease in social distance between group members through photo 
display promotes pro-social behavior and decreases over-expenditure of effort, while improved 
information feedback reduces the between-subjects heterogeneity of effort. 
We argue that knowing the opponents’ identities and effort levels are important design 
features that can influence individual behavior in practice (Smither et al., 2005). Examples of 
practical applications include college admissions, workplace promotions, patent races, political 
lobbying and competition for monopolistic rents. Our results suggest that explicitly identifying 
contestants may decrease social distance between group members and decrease wasteful over-
expenditure of effort. On the other hand, providing information feedback about others’ efforts 
may not change the aggregate effort, although it may change the dynamics of individual 
behavior. 
Our results contribute to several areas of research. First, our study contributes to the 
discussion of why there is over-expenditure of efforts in contests (Sheremeta, 2013). Over the 
past decade, a number of studies have offered various explanations such as mistakes (Potters et 
al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2011), judgmental biases and non-monotonic probability weighting 
(Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009; Kalra and Shi, 2010). Our findings suggest that over-
17 
 
expenditure in contests can also be explained by a combination of a non-monetary utility of 
winning and relative payoff maximization. Moreover, we find that such over-expenditure can be 
reduced by identifying participants through photo display. 
Second, our results contribute to the literature investigating how social identification may 
impact economic behavior in social dilemmas. Bohnet and Frey (1999a, 1999b) and Burnham 
(2003) find that visual identification increases cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator 
games. Eckel and Wilson (2006) find that seeing one’s partner impacts trust and trustworthiness. 
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Savikhin and Sheremeta (2011) find that revealing identities 
enhances pro-social behavior and increases contributions to the public goods game. We 
contribute to this literature by demonstrating that revealing identities of subjects in contests 
decreases wasteful over-expenditure of effort. 
Our study also contributes to the literature investigating how feedback about relative 
performance impacts individual behavior, which has been an area of interest in many workplace 
settings (Smither et al., 2005).
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 Kuhnen and Tymula (2012), for example, find that after 
receiving feedback, subjects who rank higher in a tournament decrease their effort, while 
subjects who rank lower increase their effort. Similarly, Ludwig and Lünser (2012), document 
that in a two-stage tournament, contestants who lag behind tend to raise their effort in the second 
stage, while those who lead tend to reduce their effort. Ludwig and Lünser (2012) also find that 
on average there is no significant difference in total effort between the feedback and the no-
feedback treatments. Together with these experiments, the results of our experiment indicate that 
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 There are several studies that investigate how information feedback impacts market performance. Isaac and 
Walker (1985), for example, find that in auctions, bidding levels decrease when bidders receive information 
feedback about all bids. Similarly, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) find that reporting the entire distribution of 
prices facilitates collusion in a first-price auction. 
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providing information feedback does not affect aggregate effort in contests but it does change the 
dynamics of individual behavior.
20
 
There are many avenues for future research. Given the strong impact of social recognition 
on individual behavior, it would be interesting to investigate other settings by varying the degree 
of social consciousness of players. One potential direction for future research is to investigate 
behavior when endowments are asymmetric. When endowments are asymmetric, the effect of 
displaying photos may be stronger as players with greater endowment may feel more conscious 
about exerting higher effort and thus imposing higher negative externality on their team 
members.  
Finally, it is important to examine how individuals would self-select into alternative 
contests, knowing that their identities may be revealed. On the one hand, the results of our 
experiment indicate that in treatments with revealed identities subjects exert significantly lower 
efforts and thus earn higher payoffs. On the other hand, subjects may be averse to having their 
identities revealed and thus may avoid more profitable but less “private” contests. We leave 
these questions for future research. 
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 Interestingly, Fallucchi et al. (2012) find that giving subjects additional feedback about rivals’ efforts reduces 
aggregate effort. A potential explanation for the different findings from our study is that our experiment lasted for 20 
periods, while Fallucchi et al.’s experiment lasted for 60 periods, giving subjects more time to learn. 
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Varying Information  
Varying Identification  
No Information  
(only own effort) 
Information  
(all group members’ efforts) 
No Photo 
(identities not revealed) 
No Photo, No Information 
(NP-NI) 
2 sessions (60 subjects) 
No Photo, Information 
(NP-I) 
2 sessions (60 subjects) 
Photo  
(identities revealed) 
Photo, No Information 
(P-NI) 
2 sessions (60 subjects) 
Photo, Information 
(P-I) 
2 sessions (60 subjects) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Effort and Payoff 
Treatment Nash NP-NI NP-I P-NI P-I 
Effort,   15 29.1 (0.7) 28.3 (0.7) 
 
25.1 (0.6) 24.1 (0.6) 
Payoff,      5 -9.1 (0.9) -8.3 (1.0) -5.1 (1.0) -4.1 (1.0) 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Between-Subjects and Within-Subject Heterogeneity of Effort 
Treatment NP-NI NP-I P-NI P-I 
 Between-Subjects Heterogeneity Measure 
Periods 1-5  16.5 (0.65) 14.1 (0.62) 14.1 (0.62) 11.5 (0.53) 
Periods 16-20 18.1 (0.71) 16.0 (0.69) 14.7 (0.66) 12.9 (0.62) 
Periods 1-20 18.1 (0.35) 14.7 (0.33) 13.87 (0.31) 12.0 (0.29) 
 Within-Subject Heterogeneity Measure 
Periods 1-5  15.6 (1.21) 15.7 (1.03) 14.1 (1.11) 13.2 (1.03) 
Periods 16-20 9.17 (0.97) 16.9 (1.28) 13.8 (1.19) 13.3 (1.15) 
Periods 1-20 14.2 (0.59) 16.0 (0.56) 13.9 (0.53) 13.6 (0.50) 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. When calculating the within-subject 
heterogeneity measure one period is omitted because of the lag variable. 
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Table 4: Panel Estimation of Determinants of Effort (Lags) 
Dependent variable, effort NP-NI and P-NI NP-I and P-I 
Specification (1) (2) 
identification -1.68 -2.27 
    [1 if photo] (1.31) (1.67) 
effort-lag 0.49*** 0.50*** 
    [own effort in t-1] (0.05) (0.04) 
win-lag 1.79 -1.61 
    [own win in t-1] (2.52) (1.88) 
above-lag -1.51 -4.35*** 
    [1 if above the winning effort in t-1] (2.65) (1.65) 
below-lag 2.67 5.34*** 
    [1 if below the winning effort in t-1] (2.58) (1.88) 
period -0.25*** -0.19** 
    [period trend] (0.07) (0.07) 
constant 15.43*** 14.95*** 
 (3.04) (3.30) 
Observations 2,280 2,280 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group level. All models include 
a random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to 
account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Panel Estimation of Determinants of Effort (Non-Monetary Utility) 
Dependent variable, effort All NP-NI NP-I P-NI P-I 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
information -0.37     
    [1 if full information] (1.91)     
identification -3.76**     
    [1 if photo] (1.92)     
non-monetary 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.28* 0.20*** 0.08 
    [effort for prize 0] (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.05) (0.13) 
period -0.33*** -0.50*** -0.27 -0.25** -0.29** 
    [period trend] (0.07) (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.14) 
quiz -1.56 -0.19 -3.95 -0.69 -2.26* 
    [# correct answers on the quiz] (1.11) (2.89) (2.86) (1.72) (1.20) 
constant 37.25*** 32.42** 46.52*** 29.21*** 36.44*** 
 (5.55) (13.18) (14.76) (7.74) (5.85) 
Observations 4,800 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group level. All models include a random effects 
error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made 
by individual subjects. 
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Figure 1: Average Effort by Treatments 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Average Bid by Subject in Each Treatment 
 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Average Effort
Subject ID
NP-NI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Average Effort
Subject ID
NP-I
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Average Effort
Subject ID
P-NI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Average Effort
Subject ID
P-I
26 
 
Appendix (Not for Publication) – Instructions for P-I Treatment 
In this experiment you will be placed in a group of 4 participants (including you). You will remain in the 
same group for the entire experiment. The experiment will consist of 20 periods. At the end of the experiment 2 out 
of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. After you have completed all periods two tokens will be 
randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which 
two periods are going to be paid in the game. 
Each period you will be given 80 francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the rate of 15 francs = $1. Each period, you will select a bid.  
Each group member will receive a randomly chosen ID for the experiment (a number from 1 to 4). 
Your ID will remain the same for the entire experiment. The photos and names of each member of your 
group will be displayed on the top of your screen at all times below each member’s ID. 
 
Each period, you and all other participants will be given an initial endowment of 80 francs and you will be 
asked to decide how much you want to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 80 francs to you and the other four 
participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants have 
made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid 
at the end of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. If you receive 
the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus the reward minus your bid. If you do not receive 
the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bid. 
 
If you receive the reward:     Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 80 + 80 – Your Bid  
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 80 – Your Bid 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your 
group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one 
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 
4 participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 80 francs. Thus, 
your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs 
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all 4 participants in your group bid. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, 
you can increase your chance of receiving the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will 
have to pay their bids. 
Chance of receiving the 
reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the 4 participants in the group. 
  
Example: Let’s say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, 
and participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets 
to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer 
randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest 
chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 
chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance of receiving the reward. 
 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not.  
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, your bid, whether you received the reward or not, and your earnings for the 
period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record 
your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
In addition, you will see the bids of your group members by their ID numbers and whether they 
received the reward. The photos and names of all your group members will also be displayed on the outcome 
screen above their IDs. 
 
 
